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Abstract. In hoping, what is important to us seems possible, which makes our 
life appear meaningful and motivates us to do everything within our reach to 
bring about the things that we hope for. I argue that it can be rational to rely on 
one’s hope: hope can deceive us, but it can also represent things correctly to us. 
I start with Philip Pettit’s view that hope is a cognitive resolve. I reject this view 
and suggest instead that hope is an emotion: hope is a felt evaluation for which 
we can define a  corresponding  character trait  which in its turn qualifies as 
a virtue if it is felt whenever its correctness conditions are satisfied. For religious 
hope in particular it follows from my analysis that, if I believe, I may hope.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite what might be suggested by the title, this talk is not about Kant and 
not even primarily about the philosophy of religion. In this paper, when 
I talk about hope, I do not mean a concept which is already religiously 
or politically charged. My concern is, first of all, with hopes that shape 
our everyday life, such as the hope that VFB Stuttgart defeated 1. FC 
Nürnberg on Thursday; or the hope that the faculty meeting tomorrow 
will be finished before my son’s kindergarten closes; or the hope that the 
international community will get a handle on climate change; or simply 
the hope that the weather will be nice at the weekend. A characteristic 
of hope is that bringing about what one hopes for is to a certain extent, 
if not completely, beyond one’s power. In this regard the secular hope 
that VFB Stuttgart defeated 1. FC Nürnberg on Thursday does not differ 
from religious hope. I will generally assume that the difference between 
118 SABINE DÖRING
religious and secular hope is simply a matter of their having different 
objects. Starting from this assumption, I believe that understanding what 
hope is and what role it plays in our life requires an analysis of a range of 
quite different hopes.
My focus will be on the question of whether it may sometimes be 
rational for us to rely on our hope. I shall answer this question in the 
affirmative and shall even claim that hope is a virtue of human beings 
as Rational Animals. I say ‘even’ because, traditionally, hope is suspected 
of being self-deceptive. A  prime example is Friedrich Nietzsche who, 
referring to Hesiod’s Pandora-myth, dismisses hope as ‘the worst of all 
evils, because it protracts the torments of man’ by blinding him to the 
fact of living in a world of hardship, disease, and suffering (Nietzsche 
1996: fragm. 71). The aim of my talk is to refute a  Nietzschean view: 
although hope does sometimes deceive us, it can also be appropriate and 
fulfils an indispensable function for our life.
Showing this demands, of course, an  explanation of what hope is. 
Providing such an explanation is made difficult by the fact that hope, 
and secular hope in particular, has hitherto been largely ignored by 
philosophers. One of the rare exceptions is Philip Pettit. I will take his 
2004 article Hope and Its Place in Mind as my starting point here, chiefly 
because Pettit deals therein with precisely the rationality of hoping 
(Pettit 2004).1
II. HOPE AS A COGNITIVE RESOLVE
Pettit begins with the attempt to find a core meaning in the term ‘hope’, 
the ‘lowest common denominator that is present across the different 
usages possible’ (p.  154). This analysis leads him to equate hope with 
a  suitable a  suitable belief-desire pair: the belief that a certain state of 
affairs may or may not obtain, where one desires that it does obtain 
(pp. 153-54). Hope thus appears to be an  intentional mental state that 
involves two components: a cognitive belief and a conative desire.
The belief assigns a certain subjective probability to the desired state of 
affairs which must be neither 0 nor 1. Hoping that something happens is 
inconsistent with believing for certain that it will not happen; it is equally 
inconsistent with believing for certain that it will. For example, it would 
be inconsistent for me to hope that I will spend my holidays at the Great 
1 Unless otherwise specified, all page references within this article refer to Pettit 2004.
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Barrier Reef when I know that I cannot afford the trip; for in that case 
I am aware that a trip to Australia is mere wishful thinking and therefore 
has a probability of occurrence of 0. Conversely, Pettit’s so-called ‘core 
analysis’ also excludes the possibility of hoping for something to happen 
to which I assign a probability of occurrence of 1. When I have booked 
a trip to the Great Barrier Reef and am confident that I will make the 
trip, I do not feel hope but pleasant anticipation. And in order to be able 
to assert consistently ‘I hope that VFB Stuttgart defeated 1. FC Nürnberg 
on Thursday’, I must not yet know that they won 6:0.
To summarise: according to Pettit, hope consists basically of two 
components. First, a person who hopes that p must assign a probability 
to p which is greater than 0 and less than 1. Secondly, the person must 
desire that p obtains.
Now, Pettit dismisses this core analysis as too ‘superficial’ to capture 
hope in a  ‘substantial’ sense. ‘Substantial’ hope, Pettit says, cannot be 
reduced to combinations of beliefs and desires but is a sui generis mental 
state which to have ‘we might describe as cognitive resolve’ (p. 159). This 
idea is modelled on Michael Bratman’s influential ‘belief-desire-intention 
model’ (Bratman 1987). According to Bratman, the standard model of 
the explanation of action, the ‘belief-desire model’, is unable to account 
for the phenomenon of planning and for the intra- and interpersonal 
coordination of action which planning allows. As the name ‘belief-
desire-intention model’ already indicates, Bratman claims that this 
phenomenon can only be explained by bringing in intentions as a further 
class of mental states, in addition to beliefs and desires. Intentions are 
differentiated from desires via their functional role and rationality 
conditions, and yet they are, like desires, classified as pro-attitudes. 
By a  ‘pro-attitude’ philosophers typically mean an  attitude of wanting 
that the world be such that p is true, where p stands for some yet to be 
realised state of affairs. Pro-attitudes thus provide ends for action, and 
this is why they are regarded as motivationally efficacious. As opposed 
to cognitive beliefs, which are said to represent the world as being such 
that their propositional content p is true, pro-attitudes are defined as 
conative states (see Smith 1994). Pro-attitudes, some philosophers have 
argued, aim at changing the world in such a way that it fits them, whereas 
beliefs, conversely, aim at fitting the world. On Bratman’s account, the 
crucial difference between ordinary pro-attitudes  – desires  – and 
intentions is that the latter are distinctive states of commitment to future 
action. Unlike a desire, Bratman says, an agent’s intention, such as the 
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intention to stick to a diet, constrains his future action by committing 
him to certain other intentions and actions, such as cutting out desserts 
or not buying sweets. According to Bratman, intentions thereby prevent 
us from being mere playthings of unpredictably coming and going 
desires. Instead, they enable us to control our actions, so as to coordinate 
those actions over time and with other agents. I am using first person 
plural pronouns here since Bratman considers the capacity for planning 
to be distinctive of human agents. In particular, planning is claimed to 
be ‘pragmatically rational’, which means that it optimises our utility (in 
the sense of satisfying our well-understood preferences). This claim is 
empirically supported by psychological studies showing that the capacity 
for impulse control (or deferred gratification) is a reliable indicator of 
social and professional success (Mischel et al. 1988).
So much for Bratman’s model. This serves as Pettit’s guide, but it 
is not something I  want to criticize here. My concern is rather with 
Pettit’s attempt to transfer this model to hope. Pettit introduces hope as 
a ‘cognitive counterpart of planning’ (p. 159). This is to say, hope commits 
its subject to certain beliefs, just as Bratman’s intentions commit their 
agents to certain actions. Bratman therefore understands intention as 
practical resolve. Analogously, Pettit construes hope as cognitive resolve, 
namely as resolve to believe that the desired state of affairs is going to 
obtain or has at least a  very good chance of obtaining (p.  158). Like 
planning, hoping is claimed to be pragmatically rational, that is, utility-
optimising. This is so by Pettit’s lights because hope enables us to escape 
the danger of losing heart and throwing in the towel when we assign 
a relatively low probability to a desired state of affairs. Because of hope, so 
the story goes, even at this low level of confidence we nonetheless act as if 
the desired state of affairs is going to obtain, thereby making every effort 
within our power to bring it about rather than becoming demoralised 
and losing self-efficacy. In a nutshell, Pettit’s ‘substantial’ hope consists 
in a ‘cognitive strategy’ of the following kind: the hoping person desires 
that a certain state of affairs p obtains but assigns such a low probability 
of occurrence to p that she is in danger of losing heart and her capacity 
to exercise agency effectively. Thanks to hope this danger is averted, as 
the person resolves upon taking the occurrence of p as certain or at least 
as highly probable (almost certain). This cognitive resolve makes her 
psychically stable and enables her to engage actively in increasing p’s 
probability of occurrence.
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What Pettit has in mind here is, for example, a cancer patient with 
bad prognosis. On Pettit’s account, the patient’s hoping saves him from 
becoming the victim of an ebb and flow of evidence for or against the 
possibility of his surviving, thereby enabling him to avoid the dangers 
of resorting to depression and self-pity. Instead, the patient decides to 
act as if it were certain or at least highly probable that he will survive, 
which according to Pettit means that the patient does everything within 
his reach to bring it about that he survives, thus actively improving his 
chance of survival. In another example, Pettit mentions those inmates 
of the Nazi concentration camps who managed to survive: ‘substantial’ 
hope, Pettit says, kept them from suicide or from just giving in (p. 159).
As can be seen from these examples, Pettit understands ‘substantial’ 
not just in the theoretical sense that hope cannot be reduced to 
an  ordinary belief in combination with a  desire or pro-attitude. Just 
as Bratman’s intentions are conative pro-attitudes but no ordinary 
desires, Pettit’s ‘substantial’ hope is a cognitive state, and yet no ordinary 
belief. ‘Substantial’ is obviously meant to refer throughout to ‘deep’ and 
‘pathetic’ hopes, of which it is characteristic that the hoped-for thing 
is of vital importance to the subject. Secular hopes like my hope that 
the weather will be nice at the weekend, or that VFB Stuttgart defeated 
1. FC Nürnberg on Thursday, are thus not captured by Pettit’s analysis. 
Although I might well be seriously engaged in hoping for these things, 
normally, if I  assign a  low probability to their occurrence, there is no 
danger of me becoming demoralised and losing my capacity to exercise 
agency effectively.
Even if we grant that it is legitimate to conceive of substantial hope 
as a  specific and specifiable kind of hope, it is easy to find examples 
which show that this kind of hope is not pragmatically rational. One 
counterexample is provided by Pettit himself, when he draws a parallel 
between substantial hope and precaution. Like hope, precaution is 
understood as a  cognitive strategy. The difference between hope and 
precaution is that the precautious person does not desire that a certain 
state of affairs p obtains, but fears that p obtains, whilst again assigning 
a  low probability of occurrence to p. According to Pettit, precaution 
then amounts to acting nonetheless as if p is going to obtain, which 
is to make provisions for p’s being the case, by which the person is 
supposed to decrease p’s probability of occurrence and so to optimise 
her utility. Pettit’s example is a client who fears that he will run into debts 
by renovating his house, as the renovation costs might be higher than 
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budgeted for in advance by the craftsmen; although the client trusts the 
craftsmen’s calculation, he resolves upon acting as if the renovation is 
becoming more expensive and thus decreases the possibility that he will 
run into debts.
Now, a person who fears that she will run into debts could equally 
be described as a  person who desires that she will not run into debts. 
Let us, for the sake of argument, further assume that this person assigns 
a low probability to not running into debts – or that she assigns a high 
probability to running into debts. On Pettit’s view, this person would 
have to hope substantially in order to preserve self-efficacy. However, she 
clearly would not optimise her utility, were she acting as if it were certain 
that she will not run into debts.
Such counterexamples are legion. They exemplify a maxim expressed 
by the proverb ‘Hope for the best, but prepare for the worst’, which also 
guides our reasonable handling of unlikely but disastrous events, such 
as an air crash or a nuclear MCA (maximum credible accident). Pettit 
breaks with this maxim: on his account, the hoping person thinks and 
acts on the conviction that the best certainly does come about, rather 
than preparing for the worst and protecting themselves against it. Yet on 
closer examination not even Pettit’s own examples sustain this analysis. 
By undergoing treatments which possibly have harmful secondary effects 
and may even be themselves life-threatening, the seriously ill patient 
with a bad prognosis does not act as if the best will come about. In full 
accordance with the cited maxim, he rather seeks to avert the worst – 
his death – by all the means available to him. Similarly, the inmates of 
the Nazi concentration camps fought for their survival: why should 
they have done so, had they taken it for granted that they would come 
through the Nazi horrors? It is therefore highly doubtful that it could 
ever be pragmatically rational (utility optimising) to adopt the cognitive 
strategy which Pettit identifies with substantial hope.
III. HOPE AS A FELT EVALUATION
Setting aside any reservations one may have about the precise details 
of Pettit’s account, the key question is whether hope is a  cognitive 
strategy in Pettit’s sense. I don’t share this view. From an epistemological 
point of view, it makes hope subject to Nietzsche’s objection that hope 
is self-deception. Against this Pettit insists that substantial hope does 
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not come down to self-deception but is ‘make-believe’ and as such ‘at 
least evidentially not irrational’: epistemic reasons are claimed to be 
outweighed by pragmatic ones in this case (p. 162). But we are not offered 
an argument for this claim and, in any case, we have just seen that it is 
not pragmatically rational to go for so-called ‘substantial’ hope.
Those in grip of the standard belief-desire model may be inclined 
to object that the correct cognitive strategy consists in taking the 
occurrence of what one hopes for, p, as possible rather than certain. This 
cognitive resolve seems to evade the counterexamples just mentioned 
and also seems compatible with the probability of occurrence assigned 
to p – provided that this is neither 0 nor 1, which possibility is excluded 
for conceptual reasons, according to Pettit. I  present four arguments 
against this ‘repair proposal’:
(1) Hope cannot be understood purely strategically. Let us first consider 
the special case of religious hope: if a person hoped for purely strategic 
reasons, she would be like a person who came to believe in God because 
of Blaise Pascal’s famous wager. Starting from the assumption that we are 
incapable of knowing whether God exists or not, Pascal (1910: sect. III) 
offers a decision-theoretical argument to the effect that we have reason 
to believe in God. Provided that the probability of God’s existence is 
greater than zero, and provided further that going to heaven is infinitely 
much better than burning in hell, the expected utility of believing in 
God is higher than that of not believing in him. The expected gain of 
believing in God in the event that he exists outweighs the negligible costs 
of believing in God in the event that he does not exist; hence, believing 
in God is the dominant strategy. Even if we accepted this argument and 
thought it psychologically possible to make ourselves believe in God 
by virtue of a pragmatic decision, this belief would seem to be held for 
reasons which are of the wrong kind. Analogously, my reasons to hope 
for future redemption in God’s kingdom would be of the wrong kind if 
I decided to hope for this simply because it would optimise my expected 
utility. The same applies to secular hope. Just imagine a bridegroom who 
hopes for the success of his marriage only in order to maximise his well-
understood self interest. Whatever Nobel Prize winner Gary S. Becker 
might say here, in this case, the bridegroom’s hope appears to us to rest 
on reasons of the wrong kind.
(2) Pascal’s reasons are of the wrong kind because they are practical 
instead of epistemic reasons: they are reasons to bring it about that we 
believe in God, but not reasons to believe in God (see Skorupski 2007). 
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In  the same way, Pettit’s reasons are reasons to bring it about that we 
hope, but not reasons to hope. Yet what could reasons to hope be?
(3) Reasons to hope stem from a value assigned to what one hopes for, 
which a purely strategic analysis of hope cannot but fail to capture. In 
hoping for future redemption in God’s kingdom or for the success of his 
marriage, the subject ascribes a certain value to the object of his hope as 
such which cannot be reduced to the satisfaction of subjective preferences. 
The question of whether it is ‘worthwhile’ to hope is ambiguous: it does 
not merely ask whether it pays off for the subject to hope; it also asks 
whether what one hopes for merits that hope. Be it religious or secular 
hope, to hope for something is to see that thing as valuable in a way that 
goes beyond the standard of the theory of rational choice, and this is 
precisely why the examples just mentioned appear so absurd. Hope fits 
this diagnosis in that it conceptually implies an evaluation of its object 
as good in a certain sense. If someone claimed to hope that p while at 
the same time denying that there is anything good about p, we would 
be conceptually excluded from understanding. As a  consequence, we 
may assess hope, or rather the evaluation implied by it, for correctness 
or appropriateness, and reasons to hope (as opposed to reasons to bring 
it about that one hopes) are reasons in favour of this evaluation. (Let 
us be clear that Pettit cannot smuggle in this evaluation via the desire 
part of his model, since his desires are conative states and must not be 
transformed into their opposite, cognitive states.)
(4) Finally, a  purely strategic analysis also misses the phenomenal 
aspect of hope, the ‘what-it-is-like’ to hope. Sometimes hope is joyful, 
sometimes it is anxious; in any case it is always inspired by a feeling of 
confidence of a certain degree. By contrast, both beliefs and desires lack 
phenomenality under the standard interpretation (Smith 1987).
Like many authors before me, I  am here claiming that, first and 
foremost, hope is an  emotion. As such, hope is no evaluative belief 
(or value judgement) but a  felt evaluation for which we can define 
a  corresponding character trait which in its turn can be associated 
with a virtue. In a way this leads us back to David Hume when he says: 
‘A propensity to hope and joy is real riches, one to fear and sorrow real 
poverty’ (Hume 1964a: 220). ‘In a way’ because Hume does not seem 
to think of emotions as cognitive states, that is, as representational 
evaluations which are therefore subject to correctness conditions. Let us, 
for the sake of argument, nonetheless ascribe this currently predominant 
view of emotion to him, for then an analysis of hope along the lines of 
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Hume’s does show what a  Pettit-style analysis attempts to but cannot 
show: that hope presents what is valuable as possible, thereby motivating 
us to make every effort within our power to bring it about.
Let us start with the relation between emotion and virtue. For any 
emotion we can define a  corresponding character trait, namely the 
disposition to readily have that emotion. Jealousy is shown by jealous 
people, though people who do not have a  jealous character can on 
occasion experience jealousy. Hope is shown by confident people, among 
others. And confidence is associated with the virtue of asserting itself at 
the right times, though this may not be traditionally considered a virtue. 
Character links to virtue links to emotion.
Primarily, hope is an  emotion: a  felt evaluation whose felt aspect 
necessarily involves feelings of confidence of a certain degree. Now, to 
feel confidence in hoping means seeing what one hopes for as being 
possible. Clearly, this kind of seeing something as possible essentially 
differs from the assignment of subjective probability. A similar view is to 
be found in Hume’s Treatise. Like Pettit, Hume notes that hope need not 
bow to probability. Sometimes we continue to hope for something even 
when we believe, and know, that the occurrence probability of that thing 
is almost 0. ‘Hope dies last’, so the proverb says. For an example, we need 
look no further than Pettit’s cancer patient who holds on to his hope 
of survival, despite his gloomy prognosis. Alternatively, take the parents 
who, against all odds, never give up the hope that their abducted child 
will return safely, and who collapse only upon being confronted with 
their child’s corpse. Pettit has it that, in such cases, the hoping person’s 
desire that p causes her to resolve upon making herself believe that p is 
going to obtain, because of p’s vital importance. Hume agrees that ‘the 
smallness of probability is compensated by the greatness of the [good]’ 
here (Hume 1964b: 220). But Hume’s hoping person does not in any way 
decide to ignore actual probability for putatively good pragmatic reasons. 
Rather, this person’s hope persists even though she believes, and even 
knows, that the occurrence of the ‘good’ is very unlikely. In other words, 
Hume allows for the possibility that a state of affairs p may seem possible 
to us even if we assign a low probability of occurrence to p, provided that 
we value p via hope as a particularly important good.
On Hume’s account, this is possible precisely because, being 
an  emotion, hope does not involve a  belief about p’s probability of 
occurrence. Provided that hope nonetheless has a  representational 
content, that is, evaluates its object as good, it may instead be understood 
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as a perception-like seeming (see Bealer 1998). As such, hope does not 
quantify this good as probable on a scale from 0 to 1 but presents it as 
possible, insofar as we feel confident that this good will be brought about. 
It speaks in favour of this view that there are many cases of hoping in 
which the subject would appear odd, if not neurotic, if he engaged in 
probability calculations: think again of the bridegroom who hopes for 
the success of his marriage...
Let us now turn to the question of how hope can make other states 
and actions rational. So far, hope has been introduced as an  emotion 
which relates to a  virtue. As an  emotion, hope has been described as 
a felt evaluation which is not or does not involve a belief but resembles 
a  perception. The analogy is instructive, since perceptual illusions like 
the famous Müller-Lyer illusion illustrate that perceptions may persist in 
spite of the subject’s better judgment, without the subject being irrational. 
In perceiving the two Müller-Lyer lines, we cannot rid ourselves of seeing 
these lines as being of different lengths even when careful study has 
convinced us that they are the same length. But still, as long as the illusion 
is recognised as such and does not influence our thought and action, we 
are not irrational. In the same way, hope can rationally persist when we 
know that it deceives us. The cancer patient with a bad prognosis or the 
parents of the abducted child are not irrational simply because they hope. 
People are not irrational if they cannot help hoping even against better 
knowledge. They would be irrational only if they guided their thought 
and action as if it were certain that that the things for which they hoped 
would come about – which is precisely what Pettit claims.
However, when does hope deceive us, and when is it rational to rely 
on one’s hope? I have argued that hope presents a not yet realised state 
of affairs as good and at the same time as possible, insofar as the subject 
feels confident to a certain degree that the state of affairs will be brought 
about. Accordingly, hope can deceive us in three different respects: (a) 
it can present as good what is in fact bad or evil; (b) it can present as 
possible what is actually impossible; (c) it can do both at once. In everyday 
language we say that, under these conditions, hope is inappropriate. The 
hope that my enemy will suffer a hard fate is inappropriate, and so is 
the hope that I will spend my holidays at the Great Barrier Reef when 
I  obviously cannot afford the trip. However, depending on value and 
probability, hope can also be appropriate. In that case, it is rational for 
the subject to rely on their hope; in that case, we may hope in the sense 
that we are warranted in grounding our thought and action on our hope.
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Technically speaking, the appropriateness of hope is the correctness of 
its representational content. Similarly to a perception, hope represents the 
world as being a certain way: it represents a certain not yet realised states 
of affairs as a  possible good. Therefore, hope is subject to correctness 
conditions which are meant to ensure that its representational content 
is correct: just as a perception of red is supposed to represent red things 
only, hope is supposed to represent as possible goods what really are 
possible goods. If a person relies on her hope – that is, takes her emotion’s 
representational content at face value – she is rational to the extent that 
her emotion’s correctness conditions are satisfied  – or rather, to the 
extent that the correctness conditions of her emotion’s representational 
content are satisfied. As a character trait corresponding to the emotion, 
hope qualifies as a virtue if it is felt whenever its correctness conditions 
are satisfied.
For the present, let me explain just one correctness condition to 
which we do submit hope in our everyday practice. We demand that, 
at least to a  certain extent, the feeling of confidence involved in hope 
be consistent with actual probability. Although the possibility of what 
is hoped for envisaged in virtue of confidence is essentially different 
from probability, we dismiss hope as inappropriate when we assign 
to its object a  probability of occurrence of 0 or near to 0, depending 
also on the size of the value involved. Conversely, we have seen that if 
p’s probability of occurrence equals 1 or is very high, we often regard 
pleasant anticipation rather than hope as the appropriate emotion. 
Although the felt possibility implied by hope must not be misinterpreted 
as cold-bloodedly calculated probability, we transform felt possibility 
into probability by determining threshold values above or below which 
we find hope inappropriate. This is to operationalise hope in terms of 
the aim of assessing its accordance with actual probability. The cancer 
patient’s hope for recovery or the parents’ hope for the safe return of their 
missing child may represent a good however great, but if the occurrence 
probability of the thing hoped for falls below a certain threshold value, 
we treat the hopes of these persons like the perception of the Müller-Lyer 
lines, as a mere illusion.
Once again, this is not to say that the cancer patient or the parents 
are irrational when they cannot give up their hopes in the face of actual 
probability. Like the perception of the two lines of the Müller-Lyer 
illusion, their hopes may be irrefutable, even though sadness, despair or 
resignation would be appropriate instead of hope. This does not itself 
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make these persons irrational, for the rationality of a person depends on 
that she relies on her hope only if this emotion’s correctness conditions 
are satisfied. As a  character trait, hope is a  virtue if it is readily felt 
under these conditions. Then we are justified in seeing the possibility 
of the future bringing good things, and this kind of seeing – ‘affective 
perception’ as I have called it elsewhere – is to a large extent independent 
of the probability assigned to those things.
The latter is crucial to hope as a virtue, and in particular to hope as 
a virtue of the Rational Animal. From what I have said so far it follows, 
first, that hope plays a  crucial role in recognising valuable projects or 
chances and distinguishing them from projects or chances that are not 
valuable. One’s unexpected state of hoping for something may for the 
first time lead one to judge that the thing is valuable. Secondly, hope 
allows for the possibility of hoping ‘for the best’ even in the face of low 
probability, and does so without forcing us to deceive ourselves or to 
engage in make-believe. To hope is to see the possibility of the future 
bringing good things, and this way of seeing is legitimate over a wide 
range of probability. Be it religious or secular, it is characteristic of hope 
that bringing its object about lies to a certain extent, if not completely, 
beyond our power. In hoping we are confident, which gives us stability in 
the ebb and flow of evidence for or against the likelihood of the occurrence 
of what we hope for. So what is important to us seems possible, which 
makes our life appear meaningful and motivates us to do everything 
within our reach to bring about the things about that we hope for. This 
is, I suppose, an evolutionary advantage of hoping, and it makes hope 
indispensable for long-term tasks or projects. By presenting the success 
of these tasks or projects as both valuable and possible, hope enables us 
to stay patient and to not become weak, as is exemplified by the hope of 
Abraham in The Epistle to the Romans (Rom.: 4-5). Nevertheless, hope 
must not make us blind to the true prospects of success.
It follows from the analysis suggested here that, for religious hope in 
particular, the rationality of hope requires that one at least does not rule 
out the occurrence of what one hopes for in order for this emotion to be 
rational. Religious hope necessarily requires faith, a faith, though, which 
has nothing to do with the calculation of probability and which in any 
case is significantly different from knowledge in the philosophical sense of 
true and justified belief: we cannot know that God exists; but conversely 
we cannot know that God does not exist. Therefore, the possibility of 
his existence and recurrence cannot rationally be excluded, and thus, 
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if I believe in God, it is not irrational to hope. If I believe, I may hope. 
Finally, to quote Kant : ‘Ich musste also das Wissen aufheben, um zum 
Glauben Platz zu bekommen’ (KrV, B XXX) . In addition to this we may 
say: ‘und um hoffen zu dürfen’.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bealer, George. 1998. ‘Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy’, in M. R. 
DePaul/W. Ramsey (ed.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition 
and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield), 
pp. 201-204
Bratman, Michael. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press)
Hume, David. 1964a. ‘The Sceptic’, in Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, 
Vol. 1, ed. by T. H. Green/T. H. Grose (Aalen: Scientia)
Hume, David, 1964b. A Treatise of Human Nature (in two volumes), Vol. 2, ed. by 
T. H. Green/T. H. Grose (Aalen: Scientia)
Kant, Immanuel. 1976. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. by R. Schmidt (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner)
Mischel, Walter/Shoda, Yuichi/Peake, Philip. 1988. ‘The nature of adolescent 
competencies predicted by preschool delay of gratification’, in Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 54: 687-696
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1996. Human, All Too Human: A  Book For Free Spirits, 
transl. by R. J. Hollingdale, intro. by R. Schacht (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press)
Pascal, Blaise. 1910. Pensées, transl. by W. F. Trotter (London: Dent, 1910)
Pettit, Philip. 2004. ‘Hope and Its Place in Mind’, in Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 592: 152-165
Skorupski, John. 2007. ‘Buckpassing about Goodness’, in T. Rønnow-Rasmussen 
et al. (eds.), Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek 
Rabinowicz. Available at: <http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/index.
htm> [accessed 21/07/2014].
Smith, Michael. 1987. ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’, in Mind, Vol. 96: 
36-61
Smith, Michael. 1994. The Moral Problem (Oxford/Malden, MA: Blackwell)
